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PUTTING THE "PUBLIC" BACK INTO 

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 

AUDREY G. McFARLANE* 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of the public-private partnership for much of what lo­
cal governments seek to accomplish, particularly in the area of eco­
nomic development, is celebrated in notions and writings about 
good government.1 Because such partnerships involve the adminis­
tration of government through informal influence and relationships, 
they are also denounced as evidence of an impenetrable web of 
structural disadvantage for community residents and property own­
ers.2 Buried beneath the furor over Kelo v. City of New London's3 
reendorsement of broad city discretion to use the power of eminent 
domain for economic development are a number of implicit ques­
tions: First, is economic development, as currently practiced, neces­
sary? Second, are public-private joint ventures essential to 
implement successful economic development? Third, do public-pri­
vate partnerships work? Finally, what is the basis for answering the 
third question-i.e., on what basis do we measure the success or 
efficacy of public-private partnerships? These questions are under­
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
1. See generally STEPHEN GOLDSMITH, THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CITY: RES­
URRECTING URBAN AMERICA (1999); Robin Paul Malloy, The Political Economy of 
Co-Financing America's Urban Renaissance, 40 VAND. L. REV. 67, 70 (1987) (describ­
ing a celebration of public-private partnerships as a successful method of financing re­
development); Lynne Moulton & Helmut K. Anheier, Public-Private Partnerships in the 
United States: Historical Patterns and Current Trends, in PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNER­
SHIPS: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECDVE 105 (Stephen P. Os­
borne ed., 2000). But see Michael Keating, Commentary: Public-Private Partnerships in 
the United States from a European Perspective, in PARTNERSHIPS IN URBAN GOVERN­
ANCE: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 163, 171 (lon Pierre ed_, 1997) (arguing 
that the attribution of positive qualities to the public-private partnership ignores power 
relationships which ensure that the purposes or goals of the partnership will reflect the 
purposes of the more powerful member of the partnership). 
2. See, e.g., lotham Sederstrom, Yards Sued on Plan to Grab Land, DAILY NEWS 
(N.Y.), Feb. 8, 2007, at 1 (describing the furor over the Atlantic Yards redevelopment). 
3. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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appreciated as broad normative policy questions; they are rarely 
asked and even more rarely answered. To the extent these ques­
tions are considered at ali, the analysis hinges somewhat unproduc­
tively on irresolvable attempts to distinguish between proper public 
motives and improper private means.4 
There are tangible and practical reasons for a city and private 
actors to align. Ideally, such alignments take place to address goals 
jointly that could not or would not be met by either party sepa­
rately. The distinction between could and would has been at the 
heart of much of the controversy surrounding redevelopment, emi­
nent domain, and public-private partnerships. However, once the 
term "economic development" is invoked, all analysis usually ends 
and these questions are typically not asked. The Kelo decision is 
consistent with the courts' general reluctance to question or scruti­
nize economic development justifications, no matter how attenu­
ated, hopeful, rosy, or improbable.s Instead, economic-develop­
ment claims are typically viewed with confidence, and the opinions 
cheerfully recite that the validity of the projected benefits are be­
yond judicial review. 
As the use of economic development has broadened beyond 
the inner city to the suburbs and middle-class areas, this traditional 
deference has begun to change.6 Recent actions at the state and 
local level have begun to reflect, indirectly, the current public dis­
trust of certain public-private partnerships as well as a strong senti­
ment that the goals and processes of these partnerships should 
embody the interests of the public. Most directly illustrative of this 
trend are the flurry of laws that have been passed at the state and 
local level to limit the use of eminent domain for general economic 
developmenU At least two state-court decisions illustrate this 
trend-that the enterprise of economic development and the vehi­
cle of the pUblic-private partnership are now subject to some scru­
4. See, e.g., id. at 477-78 (describing purely private takings as impermissible); id. 
at 501-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the impossibility of this distinction be­
cause of the merger of the public and private and how it is pointless to try to "divine 
illicit purposes" such as "purely private"). 
5. See, e.g., Maready v. Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. 1996) (rejecting a 
state constitutional challenge to business tax incentives based on optimistic predictions 
about the projected benefits of jobs and an increased tax base). 
6. Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development in the 
21st Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 895, 909 (2006). 
7. See Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization in the Post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 657, 659 (2007). Since Kelo was decided, thirty-four states have adopted 
some responsive legislation or constitutional amendment. Id. 
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tiny. In County of Wayne v. Hathcock, the Michigan Supreme 
Court restricted the use of eminent domain to projects in which the 
public has a legal right to use or to blight.s In Baltimore Develop­
ment Corp. v. Carmel Realty Associates, the Maryland Court of Ap­
peals interpreted an "open meetings" law to apply to a quasi­
private economic development entity working on behalf of the City 
of Baltimore.9 Communities have also begun to respond, not by 
protesting development, but by organizing to negotiate directly 
with private developers to assure certain community benefits arise 
out of redevelopment projects. lO This variety of activities suggests 
that the once sacrosanct and private domain of development is in­
creasingly being subjected to some form of external check on behalf 
of the public. I will discuss these approaches briefly and then offer 
some observations about the benefits and limitations of these at­
tempts to increase the "publicness" of public-private partnerships. 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP AND THE PRIVATIZED 
CHARACTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Though the aim and work of local governments seem inher­
ently public, local governments' history has consistently displayed 
both public and private characteristics.II Municipal corporations 
and other forms of general-purpose local governments receive a 
grant of the states' police and taxation powers to enable govern­
ment in furtherance of the public health, safety, and welfare. How­
ever, the reality is that many services and activities provided by 
local governments are equally capable of being defined as private.12 
8. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 773, 788 (Mich. 2004). 
9. Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 910 A.2d 406 (Md. 2006). 
10. See Sharon Pian Chan, What's In It for the Community?, SEAITLE TIMES, 
Dec. 6, 2006, at Bl, available at 2006 WLNR 21111718 (Westlaw); Terry Pristin, In Ma­
jor Projects, Agreeing Not to Disclose, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at C2, available at 
2006 WLNR 23749812 (Westlaw); Milan Simonich, Hill Residents Call for Their Share 
of the Arena Pie: Strategy Sessions Held to Secure Pens' Help in Improving Area, PIITS­
BURGH-POST GAZETTE, July 29, 2007, at B3, available at 2007 WLNR 14564436 
(Westlaw). 
11. See Gerald Frug, Property and Power: Hartog on the Legal History of New 
York City, 9 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 673, 673-78 (1984) (reviewing HENDRICK HARTOG, 
PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW 
YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983)) (discussing the history of the interaction 
between private power and use of city-owned property for profitable purposes). 
12. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) 
(rejecting the "traditional governmental function" standard as the basis for federalism 
doctrine making states immune from the application of federal law); Ball v. James, 451 
U.S. 355 (1981) (determining that a local governmental entity had a nominal and insuf­
ficiently public character and performed narrow functions that were not traditionally an 
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Also, local governments must find a way to attract the mainstream 
economy to operate within their borders, providing tax revenue, 
jobs, and other economically beneficial activities. 
In many ways, the term "public-private partnership" has saved 
city government. City government undertakes very few activities 
well enough to avoid being met with criticism or with negative re­
gard. In popular discourse, "public" is far too often a dirty word. 
Similarly, in local government doctrine, it is on those occasions 
when the city's functions are comprehended as private that the city 
is perceived more favorably and often given more autonomy as well 
as immunity from complying with constitutional guarantees.13 Pre­
sumably, a city acting in a "private" capacity is sufficiently circum­
scribed by business-profit motives or operational concerns that act 
as a proxy check on the city's exercise of governmental power. 
Thus, it would appear that in almost all other public governmental 
functions, there is a kind of psychic need for governmental legiti­
macy. Unable to supply this legitimacy itself, a city must align itself 
with private entities in order to enjoy some of the positive associa­
tion, as well as autonomy, to address the public's needs through 
employing private, business-like techniques. Ironically, the result 
of this driving need to utilize private means to address public busi­
ness is both the solution and the problem. 
However, one commonly perceived privatizing aspect of local 
governments (but inadequately accounted for in the law) derives 
from the role that "local leading citizens" often play, both formally 
and informally, in influencing the direction of government. Interest 
group theory suggests that private business elites can only direct 
government to operate in a way that benefits their interests.14 
While the jury is out, however, much skepticism abounds regarding 
whether promoting the interests of business elites works to the ben­
efit of the pUblic. One significant privatizing aspect of the practice 
aspect of government sovereignty and thus need not comply with the Equal Protection 
Clause's guarantees of one person, one vote). 
13. See, e.g., Ball, 451 U.S. at 362·72; Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1973); Mun. Bldg. Auth. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 
277-80 (Utah 1985). See generally KATHRYN A. FOSTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
SPECIAL PURPOSE GOVERNMENT (1997). 
14. See Jeffrey M. Berry et aI., Power and Interest Groups in City Politics 4-6 
(Dec. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Western New England Law Re­
view) (describing how the evolution of interest group theories from pluralism theories 
and elite theories to, most recently, regime theories in order to most accurately describe 
the informal working relationships between government and elite citizens). See gener­
ally JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF PLACE (1987). 
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of economic development may be the accepted local government 
practice of spinning off quasi-private entities as either special- or 
limited-purpose governments or public authorities. Public authori­
ties, special districts, and even business improvement districts are 
all examples of local government structures to which significant 
amounts of local government economic development activities have 
been transferred. These entities have been recognized in local gov­
ernment law as acceptable vehicles to evading state constitutional· 
limits on local governments' discretion to issue bonds or raise taxes. 
They do not have to comply with other state or municipal mandates 
designed to ensure fairness and ethical behavior in public employ­
ment or procurement of services. Unfortunately, these controls to 
prevent municipal corruption are seen as "red tape"15 because they 
seem to come at the expense of nimble responsiveness, flexibility to 
adjust to new circumstances, or creative innovation.16 These enti­
ties, which often take part in the public-private partnership for de­
velopment, also make significant portions of public decision making 
private. Thus, they are immune from direct, and often even indi­
rect, public accountability. For example, the business improvement 
district is a form of public-private partnership, indirectly related to 
development, where private property owners are empowered to 
form something akin to a homeowners' association for neighbor­
hoods to take advantage of enhanced services such as security, 
streetscape improvements, and sanitationY Not only is the district 
taking on duties formerly charged solely to the municipality, it is, in 
effect, sanctioning the city's failure to meet formerly expected 
levels of municipal services. The city is thus being carved up into 
private enclaves, not merely in terms of property ownership, but 
also in terms of financing and governance. 
15. See Barry Bozeman, A Theory of Government "Red Tape," 3 J. PUB. ADMIN. 
RES. & THEORY 273 (1993). 
16. These entities also facilitate intergovernmental decision making and action 
without disturbing local government political boundaries allowing joint action while 
maintaining separation between city and suburb, or between publicly elected govern­
ment officials (Le., the Mayor) and unpopular decisions that can be attributed to eco­
nomic realities without political cost. The impact of the decision is thus passed 
seamlessly to taxpayers. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and 
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 375-78 (1990) (discussing the costs of special­
purpose governments to central cities and the benefits to suburbs). 
17. See generally Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Im­
provement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365 (1999); Audrey G. 
McFarlane, Preserving Community in the City: Special Improvement Districts and the 
Privatization of Urban Racialized Space, 4 STAN. AGORA 5 (2003), available at http:// 
agora.stanford.edu/agora/volume4/mcfarlane.shtml. 
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More directly connected to development are the set of activi­
ties conducted jointly by cities and the private sector that are 
loosely termed "economic development." These activities take 
place in a myriad of formal and informal ways. Often an indepen­
dent agency is chartered by the state or the city, or both, to search 
for and attract business relocation or expansion to the locale.18 Part 
of the attraction strategy at the heart of the public-private partner­
ship is to use a public subsidy to facilitate a particular real estate 
development project. In return for the public subsidy, the city gets 
(1) a success story to promote; (2) needed business activity in the 
city and its attendant benefits; (3) the potential for increased tax 
revenues through increased taxable activities-though many of the 
deals are subsidized by the city foregoing the very taxable increases 
one would think were sorely needed; and (4) indirect synergistic 
benefits of signaling that the city is on the rise-that the city is the 
"place to be." 
Because of the shifting nature of public and private in under­
standing the methods and motivations of local governments, the 
partnership between local governments and private business is 
longstanding. However, this relationship is poorly conceived, mis­
understood, and mistreated by the law. Sorting through how and 
whether public-private partnerships work to fulfill public purposes 
is difficult. Some partnerships explode the public-private distinc­
tion by intermingling aspects of public powers aligned with private 
purposes for profit, and public purposes for improving the city's ec­
onomic health aligned with private methods. However, the law's 
treatment of these classifications has tended towards extreme defer­
ence depending on the economic circumstances.19 The greatest im­
pact of the public-private partnership is probably mostly one of 
perception. Notwithstanding the positive associations that the label 
evokes, the techniques utilized recast the perception of local go v­
18. See Lynne B. Sagalyn, PublidPrivate Development: Lessons from History Re­
search and Practice, 73 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 7, 10 (2007) ("Local officials set up special 
public development corporations or redevelopment authorities and staffed them with 
business-oriented executive directors who relied on specialized consultants to help com­
pare developer responses, price the development opportunity, and analyze the terms 
and conditions of the business deals for presentation to the public."). 
19. See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 94-95 (2d Cir. 
1998) (finding Business Improvement Districts to be special, limited purpose govern­
mental entities and, thus, appropriate for fulfilling narrow, i.e., private, purposes). See 
generally Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 
75 (1998); Daniel R. Garodnick, Comment, What's the BID Deal? Can the Grand Cen­
tral Business Improvement District Serve a Special Limited Purpose?, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1733 (2000). 
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ernments' emphasis and motivation in development as private. The 
quasi-private entity set up to pursue development's success is mea­
sured by how much it can accommodate private business's interests 
and needs. Thus, its emphasis is on commercial success and what 
markets define as the most lucrative technique. Due to municipal 
inability to provide adequate services, local government law has au­
thorized private business districts to manage these neighborhoods. 
The financing techniques involve leveraging off future tax revenues 
arising from the new developments. It is the very intermingling of 
those purposes, therefore, that threatens to subvert, if not 
subordinate, the public purposes to those defined or circumscribed 
by private interest. 
Whether the strands of public and private can be meaningfully 
disentangled is made altogether more difficult given the Ubiquity of 
public-private partnerships. According to urban planner Lynne 
Sagalyn, the public-private partnership has evolved over time 
through three stages, each stage progressively more private.2o 
When the federal government played a significant role as financier, 
the first stage of public-private partnerships was characterized by 
city-initiated projects.21 The second stage, characterized by the era 
of sharply waning federal financial support, also involved city-initi­
ated projects, but out of necessity turned to bootstrap techniques 
like revenue bonds and tax increment financing.22 These strategies 
were inherently of less general public benefit because the projected 
increase in tax receivables or revenue was limited to the district or 
the project. Most, if not all, of the increased taxes were used to 
repay the district's debt.23 Thus these projects were of limited ben­
efit to the rest of the city. The third and current state of public­
private partnership has turned from city-initiated or city-owned 
projects to developer- or private-corporation-initiated/owned 
projects, now referred to, somewhat ironically, as the private-public 
partnership.24 This shift towards private dominance has magnified 
the challenge that the public-private hybrid model of development 
20. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 7-8. 
21. Id. at 8-9. 
22. Id. at 9-11. 
23. See Peter Eisinger, Financing Economic Development: A Survey of Tech­
niques, GOV'T FIN. REV., June 2002, at 20, 22 (explaining tax increment financing). 
24. CHRISTOPHER B. LEINBERGER, BROOKINGS INST., TURNING AROUND DOWN. 
TOWN: TWELVE STEPS TO REVITALIZATION 5 (2005), http://www.brookings.edu/metro/ 
pubs/20050307_12steps.htm. 
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presents for notions of general public welfare and sharply attenu­
ated the democratic accountability issues. 
The reality of public-private partnerships is that they involve 
pragmatic trade-offs, compromises, and learning by doing. The 
public wins some and loses some based on knowledge, expertise, 
and market conditions of the city representatives involved in the 
deal.25 According to Christopher Leinberger, 
The public sector, usually lead [sic] by the mayor or some other 
public official, may convene the strategy process but it must 
quickly be led by the private entities whose time and money will 
ultimately determine the effort's success. A healthy, sustained 
partnership is crucial to getting the revitalization process off the 
ground and building the critical mass needed to spur a cycle of 
sustainable development. 26 
But Lynne Sagalyn notes that "public and private players 
rarely have, and do not need, equal bargaining power or equal 
stakes if risk is proportional to each partner's investment. A public 
official's bargaining power is usually greatly affected by the 
strength of the local market and the real estate cycle. "27 
Thus, apart from how suspicious it may look for cities to be 
partnering with private companies for projects that will be privately 
owned, the measure of efficacy of these projects for furthering the 
public interest will obviously depend on the criteria selected to 
evaluate the partnerships. Since these projects are now more fre­
25. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 13. 
26. LEINBERGER, supra note 24, at 8. Leinberger adds, 
The potential roles of the public in this process can vary tremendously based 
upon the needs of the particular downtown and how much political capital 
politicians are willing to expend in the effort. There are a host of activities the 
public sector may be well-positioned to undertake, however, such as improv­
ing public safety, increasing transit options and availability, constructing park­
ing facilities, attracting and retaining employment, providing appropriate tax 
incentives for new real estate development, developing an impact fee system, 
assembling land, and perhaps most importantly, creating easy-to-use zoning 
and building codes to enable the walkable urbanity that defines a thriving 
downtown. 
!d. at 9. 
27. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 13. Perhaps it is also the case that a business­
friendly discourse may contribute to a lack of imagination or creativity in approaches to 
development. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) (arguing that 
our notions of development are too narrowly focused on economic goals and should 
include human development goals); see also David Wilson, Metaphors, Growth Coali­
tion Discourses and Black Poverty Neighborhoods in a U.S. City, 28 ANTIPODE 72, 73 
(1996) (arguing that a "growth discourse[]" exists that guides and limits the direction of 
economic development). 
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quently privately owned, and often (but not always) initiated by de­
velopers, cities have "less bargaining power than when they [held] 
legal title" under an earlier generation of federally funded develop­
ment projects.28 Therefore, in order to answer the question of 
whether the public-private or private-public partnerships work, the 
predicate questions must be answered: What is the basis on which 
to measure the answer to the question? Should such partnerships 
be evaluated purely by project completion or the types and levels of 
public benefit that result from the partnership? 
A. The Measure of Public-Private Partnership Efficacy 
The problem highlighted by the recent focus on the eminent 
domain doctrine is whether, and how to measure the extent to 
which, the "publicness" of a city's proffered public benefit justifica­
tion is adequately demonstrated. The backlash following the Kelo 
decision can, in some part, be attributed to the perceived insulation 
of public authorities or other independent development entities 
from public accountability. One source of the problem for legal 
doctrine has been that the consistent goal of public-private partner­
ships is to shield their operations from red tape, including public 
participation. Thus, a consistent and troubling aspect of public­
private partnerships is the extent to which their decision making is 
shielded from public accountability. Traditionally, courts have not 
adequately dealt with this issue, coming down on the side of the 
private part of the deal and finding against democratic accountabil­
ity. Cities have been allowed to transfer government functions to 
private entities and, based on the formalism of the arrangement, the 
enterprises and their decisions have been treated as private.29 The 
popular sentiment, however, has been that some external check is 
needed because of economic development's case-by-case, transac­
tional deal-making methods. 3D As discussed in the Introduction, 
28. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 7. The Urban Development Action Grant 
(UDAG) program was a particularly popular and flexible federal funding program for 
local economic development. See Duane A. Martin, The President and the Cities: Clin­
ton's Urban Aid Agenda, 26 URB. LAW. 99, 108-09 (1994) (discussing the beginning and 
end of the UDAG program). 
29. See Jonathan Rosenbloom, Can a Private Corporate Analysis of Public Au­
thority Administration Lead to Democracy?, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 851, 854 (2005) 
(arguing that public authorities, often legally regarded as public governmental entities, 
are private corporate entities). 
30. See, e.g., Terry Jill Lassar, Introduction to CiTY DEAL MAKING 3 (Terry Jill 
Lassar ed., 1990) (discussing tension in government's role in the public-private partner­
ship as both regulator and real estate developer). 
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the redevelopment scenario described in the Kelo opinion indicates 
that the Supreme Court's approach to public-private partnerships 
may be idealistically deferentiaL31 It trusts the public-private part­
nership and regards the broad goals of development as positive, al­
beit indefinable. The dissent, in contrast, regards public-private 
partnerships with deep suspicion.32 Also, the goal of the public­
private partnership to further traditional local government projects 
through promoting economic development seems too troublingly 
vague.33 In particular, the subsidy to private corporations is viewed 
as inherently corrupting. Of course, the truth lies somewhere in 
between. 
What is unsatisfying about the Kelo decision is that the defer­
ence to city government decision making on economic development 
is unsettlingly unprotective of existing communities, residents, and 
property owners. It provides very little public oversight or check 
other than requiring the redevelopment to be undertaken with re­
spect to a well-considered plan.34 Therefore, a more satisfying or 
effective external check on public-private partnerships seems in or­
der. By taking a hands-off approach under the rubric of federalism, 
the Court has thrown these difficult questions back to the states to 
resolve. In refusing to provide federal constitutional protection 
against the perceived excesses of eminent domain, the Court gave 
strong incentive to reject the formerly complacent sense of inevita­
bility regarding economic development. It is up to state policymak­
ers, both courts and legislatures, as well as ordinary people, to get 
involved in how local communities are developing and grapple di­
rectly with the real underlying questions about their preferred vi­
31. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
32. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
33. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
34. Id. at 478-79 (majority opinion) (approving the exercise of eminent domain 
"pursuant to a 'carefully considered' development plan" (quoting Kelo v. City of New 
London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004), affd, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)). The notion of the 
"carefully considered" plan, as discussed in Kelo, is derived from land use regulation 
traditions that allow a municipality broad discretion to use zoning regulation to regulate 
land use if it is carried out according to some kind of master plan or comprehensive 
plan. While most states today, have general mandates to local government to prepare 
long-range comprehensive plans, it was not that long ago that cases regularly indicated 
how loose a standard of this was. Some states have held that the plan can be reflected 
in the nature of the zoning ordinances themselves. See, e.g., Kuehne v. Town of East 
Hartford, 72 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1950) (viewing the comprehensive plan as reflected in the 
general plan of zoning ordinances.); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public 
Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443 (2007). 
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sion of economic development. The question is, what do states 
think that check on economic development could be? 
Perhaps the states are better suited to grappling with the fac­
tual nature of the unanswered questions of economic development 
and the myriad of factual questions about the level of public sub­
sidy or public involvement in a deal. The questions boil down to, 
how much public subsidy is actually necessary or justified to make a 
particular economic development deal happen? Of course, this is a 
case-by-case determination that will vary each time and leads to 
even more questions than answers: Is the public subsidy necessary 
as an economic, dollars and cents matter, where the deal cannot 
take place without the subsidy? Is the public subsidy necessary as a 
signal to the mobile developer that the city is business friendly? 
How much of a city's contribution to the venture-either through 
direct cash, forgone tax revenue in the form of tax incentives, pay­
ments in lieu of taxes, tax increment financing, use of eminent do­
main to avoid holdouts and keep the acquisition costs low, transfers 
to the developer at a subsidized price, or regulatory waivers-re­
flects shrewd, bottom-line negotiations and concessions? How 
much of the transaction's structure reflects overly friendly relations 
among elites and accordingly poor negotiations that unnecessarily 
cost the city money in foregone taxes, that cause the publicly un­
beneficial nature and location of the development project, i.e., a 
soft form of corruption? Should economic development projects be 
rated by the most direct and clear-cut approach-that is, strictly by 
the city's direct economic return on investment project-by-project? 
The difficulty with this standard is that projects, such as stadiums, 
convention centers, and festival marketplaces, often fail to measure 
up on that basis yet are still widely adjudged to be successes. Why? 
It is often because of cumulative, yet intangible, synergies of sym­
bolism and the city's improved public image from these large 
projects.35 Both of these intangible synergies are reflected, for ex­
ample, in the national development trends that are focused on high­
end or upscale development in otherwise working-class cities. 
There is an intangible aspect to city development in terms of syn­
ergy and energy created, as well as symbolism or signaling that the 
city is a place for investment. Large-scale downtown projects prob­
ably help jump-start that image by demonstrating what is possible 
35. Also, stadium projects are considered to be public, yet they charge exorbitant 
profit-driven entry fees that do not make access available to the general public. See 
Keto, 545 U.S. at 498-505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (proposing a strict public use mea­
sure of eminent domain and listing stadia as an example of a valid public use). 
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in the city. How should these synergies count in the evaluation of 
the public-private partnership? 
The salient feature of these projects may be that public partici­
pation is mostly limited to subsidy, either through direct grants, 
waivers, or informal shepherding, or through the permitting and 
regulatory approval process or the use of eminent domain. Because 
local governments are, at least nominally, required to justify their 
activities with some kind of public purpose or public benefit, cities 
define any development project that creates a new, commercially 
viable project as contributing to the public good, regardless of the 
ownership structure or planned use. In this climate or scenario, it 
seems evident that protecting the pubic interest requires considera­
ble vigilance and attention.36 
B. 	 Putting the "Public" Back in Public-Private Partnerships: Who 
Gets to Be Part of the Developing City Via Strict 
Scrutiny of Public Use? 
I believe that two questions should govern the review of pub­
lic-private partnerships. First, who gets to be part of the redevelop­
ing city? One problem is that a lot of the new promising 
development we see is affluent focused. Cities want, and arguably 
need, the affluent among their populations and luckily many afflu­
ent people increasingly want to be in cities.37 But when this prefer­
ence for the affluent is carried out through public subsidy or public 
facilitation in the form of site preparation or exercise of eminent 
domain, our latent inability to see structural biases based on race 
and class suddenly improve and come into focus. 
One solution would be to use a principal of inclusion-socio­
economic diversity, community preservation, fundamental fair­
ness-to measure public-private partnership efficacy.38 One city 
legislative approach reflecting the inclusion principle is an inner­
city inclusionary zoning. Baltimore recently followed a small but 
growing trend in enacting inclusionary zoning for affordable hous­
36. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 17. 
37. The "retail concept" is affluence focused. Geodemographic profiling is used 
to precisely measure, tap, and shape desirable markets-blue blood estates, young 
digerati, big-city blues, and kids in cul-de-sacs. See Audrey G. McFarlane, Who Fits the 
Profile: Thoughts on Race, Class, Clusters, and Redevelopment, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
877 (2006). 
38. See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Con­
centrated Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 
(2006), where I expand on this point. 
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ing by setting aside requirements for all new developments in the 
city.39 Subsidized units have to be blended into a project regardless 
of location or market focus. Several other jurisdictions have 
adopted inclusionary zoning ordinances.4o The result of recent 
grassroots initiatives adopting mandatory inclusionary zoning can 
be seen as having implications for the public accountability of the 
public-private partnership. In effect, the legislation defines in ad­
vance what a public benefit should look like in terms of inclusion 
and economic diversity. The proponents of the legislation have 
worked closely with developers to create a compromise ordinance 
intended to be win-win-inclusion and profit. The difficulty for the 
ordinance may arise in upscale projects in a hot market. A hot mar­
ket will make it difficult to protect the developer's profit expecta­
tion. Moreover, exclusion is part of the upscale formula so some 
developers may resist inclusionary units within their projects. 
While it is questionable whether inclusionary zoning will benefit the 
lower-income population, such measures are still very important as 
the new inner city develops. 
The judicial approach to what is arguably an indirect inclusion­
based approach has taken the form of restricting the city's ability to 
use eminent domain by narrowing the definition of public use as 
advocated by the dissenters in Kelo and paralleled by the Michigan 
Supreme Court in County ofWayne v. Hathcock.41 At issue was the 
Wayne County Department of Jobs and Economic Development's 
plan for a 1300-acre business and technology park with a confer­
ence center, hotel accommodations, and a recreational facility at 
the airport as a hub of future economic activity.42 
39. See Jill Rosen, Affordable Housing Bill Passes: Developers Who Receive City 
Aid Must Provide Low-Cost Options, BALT. SUN, June 12, 2007, at lA, available at 2007 
WLNR 10945348 (Westlaw) (inclusionary housing legislation, adopted after lobbying 
by a "coalition of city religious groups, urban advocacy organizations and unions," re­
quires builders to reserve twenty percent of units in new developments for low- to mod­
erate-income residents). 
40. See David Rusk, Inclusionary Zoning: A Key Tool in the Search for Workable 
Affordable Housing Programs, PUB. MGMT., Apr. 1,2006, at 18, 20 (inclusionary zoning 
ordinances have been adopted by 107 local governments in California, and other com­
munities in Chicago, Illinois; Denver, Colorado; Washington, D.C.; Madison, Wiscon­
sin; and in the state of Illinois). 
41. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). See generally 
Symposium, Foreword: The Death of Poletown: The Future of Eminent Domain and 
Urban Development After County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 837 
(discussing the Hathcock decision). 
42. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 765. 
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City development has historically taken place around nodes of 
transportation such as canals, ports, trains, highways, and now air­
ports. The airport project at issue in Hathcock can be seen as a 
manifestation of the newest stage of transportation inspired devel­
opment, referred to as aerotransport.43 The Pinnacle Project was 
projected to create "[30,000] jobs and [$350 million] in tax revenue, 
while broadening the COUIIty's tax base from predominately indus­
trial to a mixture of industrial, service and technology."44 It was 
also aimed at "enhanc[ing the] image of the County in the develop­
ment community, aiding in its transformation [to] an arena ready to 
meet the needs of the 21st century."45 Property for the project was 
obtained through a combination of condemnation and voluntary 
purchase. Owners of nineteen parcels objected on the basis of a 
lack of necessity and public purpose under the Michigan 
Constitution.46 
The Michigan Supreme Court agreed, overruling the broad in­
terpretation of public use in the infamous Poletown case.47 Accord­
ing to the court, there was nothing about the County's decision to 
exercise eminent domain that served the public good. The only 
public benefits would occur after the property had been acquired 
and private activity occurred. Thus, the role of the government in 
carrying out a public purpose was not enough to render the efforts 
of this particular pUblic-private effort sufficiently public. The 
court's approach to putting the interests of the public in the eco­
nomic development equation was to create a very narrow standard 
for public use when the exercise of power involves: (1) a "'public 
43. See JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 39 (1991) 
(highways and airports are important for development); John D. Kasarda, Aerotropolis: 
Airport-Driven Commercial Development, in URB. LAND INST., THE FuroRE OF CITIES 
32 (Terry J. Lasser ed., 2000); John D. Kasarda, Logistics and the Rise of the Aerotro­
polis, 25 REAL EST. ISSUES 43 (2001); Greg Lindsay, Rise of the Aerotropolis, 
FASTCOMPANY.COM, July-Aug. 2006, at 76, available at http://www.fastcompany.coml 
magazine/107/aerotropolis.html ("[Clities are always shaped by the state-of-the-art 
transportation devices present at the time of their founding .... The state of the art 
today is the automobile, the jet plane, and the networked computer."); Stephen J. Ap­
pold, Visitor, & John D. Kasarda, Director, Frank Hawkins Kenan Inst. of Private 
Enter., Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Associa­
tion: Airports as the New Urban Anchors (Aug. 10, 2006), available at http:// 
www.unc.edu/-appolds/research/progress/RegionaIAnchorsMay.pdf. 
44. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770. 
45. Id. at 770-71. 
46. Id. at 787. 
47. Id. (overruling Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 
N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)). 
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necessity of the extreme sort otherwise impracticable' ";48 (2) transfer 
to those enterprises generating public benefits whose very existence 
depends on the use of land that can be assembled only by the coor­
dination central government alone can accomplish, e.g., instrumen­
talities of commerce such as highways, railroads, and canals;49 (3) 
the "private entity remains accountable to the public in its use of 
the property";50 and (4) selection of land is based on "'facts of inde­
pendent public significance."'51 In the court's view, this meant that 
the underlying purposes of condemnation rather than subsequent 
use of condemned land must satisfy the public use requirement, i.e., 
blight.52 Thus, the Hathcock court severely curtailed the reasons 
that could be offered and, by so limiting governmental discretion, 
and in particular by requiring public control of the taken property, 
indirectly increased public accountability. According to Marc B. 
Mihaly, however, and as the Hathcock decision reflects, a common 
problem is that the redevelopment process is thoroughly misunder­
stood in the courts. 53 His critique is also useful for understanding 
the limits of the debate as framed by the Supreme Court in Kelo.54 
My discussion is focused, instead, on the significance of courts being 
willing to intervene in the economic-development project on behalf 
of the public. 
Another decision reflects an increased willingness of state 
courts to intervene in the economic development process on behalf 
of the public, this time with respect to how decisions about eco­
nomic development should be made. The Maryland Court of Ap­
peals answered this question by adopting a principle of public 
accountability, signaling a dramatic departure from its prior, con­
sistently deferential, approach.55 In Baltimore Development Corp. 
48. Id. at 781 (emphasis added) (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., 
dissenting)). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 782. 
51. Id. at 783 (emphasis added) (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J., 
dissenting)). 
52. Id. 
53. See Marc B. Mihaly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and the Su­
preme Court: Kelo v. City of New London, in THE SUPREME COURT AND TAKINGS: 
FOUR ESSAYS 41 (2006), avai!able at http://it.vermontlaw.eduNJEUTakings/6-Mihaly 
.pdf. 
54. Id. 
55. Maryland has long upheld the exercise of eminent domain for economic de­
velopment. See, e.g., Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 339 A.2d 
278, 287 (Md. 1975). In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki, 916 
A.2d 324 (Md. 2007), the court recently reined in the use of Maryland's statutory 
scheme for quick-take condemnations. Though the decision, like Carmel Realty, was 
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v. Carmel Realty Associates, the court required the city's chief inde­
pendent economic development arm to comply with the Maryland's 
Public Information Act mandating disclosure in open meetings and 
disclosure of public information by city and state entities.56 Carmel 
Realty Associates and other property owners in a major downtown 
redevelopment area, known as the Westside Redevelopment, re­
sponded to a request for proposals from an independent quasi­
governmental economic development agency, the Baltimore Devel­
opment Corporation (BDC).57 The owners had a plan to redevelop 
their parcels to avoid having to relocate and to participate in the 
rejuvenation of the area. In a closed meeting, the BDC Board of 
Directors selected a developer to handle the project.58 Seeking in­
formation about how the selection had been made, the owners ar­
gued that the Board should be subject to Maryland's Open 
Meetings and Public Information Act.59 
The court held that that "the City of Baltimore Development 
Corporation is, in essence, a public body for the purposes of the 
Open Meetings Act and it is, in essence, an instrumentality of Balti­
more City for the purposes of Maryland's Public Information 
Act."60 The Kelo decision seems to have provided new impetus for 
the Court to begin scrutinizing the accepted structure of the public­
private partnership-the quasi-private redevelopment agency. The 
court discussed the debate sparked by Kelo, and echoed Justice 
O'Connor's dissent: "An external, judicial check on how the public 
use requirement is interpreted, however limited, is necessary if this 
constraint on government power is to retain any meaning."61 Even 
though the BDC did not have the power of eminent domain itself, 
the court found that the agency "function[ ed] as part of the City's 
powers of eminent domain. "62 It appears that in Maryland, Kelo 
statutory and not constitutional, it nevertheless signals a significant and noteworthy 
change to blind deference to any and all justifications falling under the rubric of "eco­
nomic development." 
56. Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 910 A.2d 406, 410 (Md. 2006) 
(discussing MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§ 10-501-10-512, -601-10-628 (LexisNexis 
2004)). 
57. Id. at 414. 
58. Editorial, It's About Time, BALT. SUN, Nov. 8, 2006, at 22A. 
59. Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 414-15. 
60. Id. at 425, 428. 
61. Id. at 417 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496-97 (2005) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)). 
62. /d. 
The BDC, among other indicia of the exercise of part of the City's powers, is 
charged by the ordinance, the contracts with the City, and by its Charter to 
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reinforced that Berman v_ Parker63 did not merely stand for the 
proposition that eminent domain was to be used solely in blighted 
areas. Instead, the power could be used for economic development 
anywhere.64 Kelo thus crystallized the enormity of the substan­
tively unchecked eminent domain power, in a way that was no 
longer limited to inner-city ghetto areas by focusing on blight, but 
could be used more broadly potentially in any neighborhood. Thus, 
the Carmel Realty court was inspired to disregard the traditional 
deferential fiction of the unquestioned benefits of economic devel­
opment and acknowledge the reality of the threat of unchecked 
power granted to the private developer through the public-private 
partnership. This was also made particularly easy in the case of the 
Carmel Realty because of the relatively sloppy separation of public 
and private functions between the BDC and Baltimore City. This 
inartful division empowered the court to refuse to give cognizance 
to (i.e., pretend not to see) the relationship between the mayor and 
the agency.65 The post-hoc attempt to recharacterize city actions as 
private and immune was patent.66 
After this decision, what is the public entitled to receive in 
terms of accountability? According to the court, "the Act does not 
afford the public any right to participate in the meetings, [but] it 
does assure the public right to observe the deliberative process and 
the making of decisions by the public body at open meetings."67 Of 
course, as limited as this observation sounds in the realm of desira­
ble community participation mechanisms, even this level of access 
could have a dramatic impact on the substantive nature and direc­
tion of economic development decisions. One factual question, to 
which the answer is yet to be determined, concerns which parts of 
the economic development decision process needs to take place be­
hind closed doors. On the one hand, "financial deal-making that is 
[traditionally] hidden from view" is likely to become more accessi­
coordinate public functions such as the preparation and adoption of urban 
renewal plans, and is thus a part of the apparatus used by the City in the 
exercise of its urban renewal powers. 
/d. at n.13. 
63. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
64. See Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 417. 
65. [d. at 428. 
66. See id. at 411 n.6 (noting that when the BDC was formed, some board mem­
bers "may have been affiliated with the City of Baltimore ... and ... at least three 
members of the Board of Directors were part of then-mayor Kurt L. Schmoke's staff"). 
67. [d. at 419 (quoting City of New Carrollton v. Rogers, 410 A.2d 1070, 1078 
(Md. 1980)). 
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ble through disclosure.68 Disclosure may subject deals to scrutiny 
but, will it scare off other potentially lucrative deals?69 
Public exposure varies at PPD [public/private development] pro­
ject milestones, including RFQ/RFP [request for qualification/re­
quest for proposal], developer selection, disposition and 
financing agreements, and deal approval. PPD projects are most 
open to scrutiny and political debate when they come to public 
attention: announcement (site selection, determination of devel­
opment program, potential public benefits), approvals (legislative 
or voter referenda, if required), and implementation (construc­
tion; cost overruns; conflicts, setbacks and collapsed expecta­
tions; successful completion). At each such point, community 
groups and local officials must strategically defend their interests, 
which they do publicly, using the press and other means.7° 
On the other hand, according to one public comment by the presi­
dent of an independent development entity, the Greater Baltimore 
Committee, the BDC's new status could complicate development: 
"Private companies are not going to want to have all of their 
books opened up just because they are looking to explore a de­
velopment opportunity," Fry said. "The reality is that economic 
development authorities do have to have some level of being able 
to protect proprietary information." "I think that there certainly 
is a public interest in having transparency," he added. "But at 
the same time though there needs to be protection so that not 
everything from the private companies is an open book."71 
Therefore, what remains to be seen is the extent to which the 
ruling makes a difference and the impact it has on deal making. 
The issue remains, can city concessions in a negotiation be ex­
amined via public hearing in a vacuum, without understanding the 
course, context, and dynamics leading to the deal or transaction, or 
possible incrementally cumulative tangible and intangible benefits? 
Ideally, the decision should cause a city that is poor at negotiation 
to engage in critical self-examination. This is so because prior unre­
68. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 13. 
69. Although "financial deal making is essentially hidden from view, ... an in­
formed media and public watchdog groups can heighten awareness." Id. (discussing 
how politics are often characterized not by broad public posturing but the shrewd tacti­
cal maneuverings of insiders). 
70. [d. at 12-13. 
71. Jen DeGregorio, Court Ruling Could Change How Baltimore Development 
Corp. Works, DAILY REC. (Balt.), Nov. 6, 2006, available at http://findarticies.comJp/ 
articies/mLqn4183/is_20061106/ai_nI6823382 (quoting remarks made by Donald C. Fry, 
President of the Greater Baltimore Committee, following the Carmel Realty decision). 
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viewed decisions will have to be justified convincingly to the public. 
Thus, the impact of Carmel Realty's increasing the points of entry 
for participation is likely to be highly beneficial. The tradeoff is 
likely to be that increased public involvement will be messy and will 
slow down time-sensitive projects by adding new uncertainty in an 
arena whose costs are measured by investors looking for quick, se­
cure returns.72 The time value of money is a significant constraint. 
C. 	 Public-Private Partnership and Bargaining with the 
Community: Community Benefits Agreements 
The final response to public-private partnership can be found 
in so-called community benefits agreements (CBAs). CBAs can be 
valuable mechanisms for adding the public interest or the "use" val­
ues of development; values that are often left out of the develop­
ment process.73 Values such as inclusiveness, transparency, 
coalition building, and clarity of outcomes (by providing quantifi­
able measures) are often lacking in economic development assess­
mentJ4 The benefits-agreements approach presumes that 
development inevitably will take place, but that it is possible to ei­
ther lessen the negative impact on existing communities or at least 
ensure that the development produces tangible benefits for existing 
residents. The inspiration for CBAs was that local governments 
ideally would seek to get commitments on behalf of communities 
from developers,75 but these arrangements were rarely fulfilled. 
This was often because the incentive to comply with the agreement 
on the part of the developer would likely be strongest while approv­
72. See CHRISTOPHER B. LEINBERGER, BROOKINGS INST., BACK TO THE FUTURE: 
THE NEED FOR PATIENT EQUITY IN REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 6 (2007) 
(noting that real estate finance no longer regards real estate as a forty-year, long-term 
asset, but instead as a short-term asset with a seven- to ten-year horizon). 
73. See John J. Costonis, Tinker to Evers to Chance: Community Groups as the 
Third Player in the Development Game, in CITY DEAL MAKING, supra note 30, at 155 
(stating how a community turns the public-private partnership into a "trilateral rela­
tionship"). "Use" values refers to the value residents place on the benefits of using 
their neighborhoods. These contrast with "exchange" values, which are the values that 
developers or real estate speculators place on the economic benefits to be extracted 
from a community. See generally David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely 
Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63, 90-91 (1991) (discussing the 
difference between use and exchange values). 
74. JULIAN GROSS, GREG LERoy & MADELINE JANIS-ApARICIO, GOOD JOBS 
FIRST, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS Ac­
COUNTABLE 21-22 (2005), available at http://www.communitybenefits.orgldownloads! 
CBA%20Handbook%202005%20final.pdf. 
75. 	 Id. at 10. 
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als were neededJ6 "CBAs are an attempt to address this problem, 
both by memorializing developer commitments in writing and by 
enabling community groups to enforce them, rather than having to 
rely on local governments."77 
In the contractual agreement between representatives of com­
munities in which a development project will take place and the 
developer, the project's developer promises to provide a variety of 
amenities (for example, open space or physical upgrades to existing 
buildings or roads) or to take certain beneficial actions (such as first 
hire agreements, low-income tenant set-asides, or to provide cash). 
In return, the community gives two things: First, it agrees to pub­
licly support the development project, sometimes a prerequisite for 
developers getting regulatory approvals. Second, it promises to re­
frain from entering into litigation against the deveioperJ8 
This is a tenuous and limited form of inserting the public into 
the pUblic-private partnership for a number of reasons. To begin 
with, though the community ostensibly is brought into the deal­
making process, it is often a tangential participant. The massive re­
development planned in Brooklyn, New York, called Atlantic 
Yards, illustrates the problem with coalition-building. "[B]uilding 
and maintaining coalitions is difficult, especially if the developer is 
seeking to peel off some groups."79 Also, inadequate organizing 
could mean that the community's agreement is actually not ideal 
and thus sets poor precedent for future projects.80 From the devel­
oper's perspective, the role of the community is less than positive 
because the community's power comes from the ability to provide 
conflict and opposition.81 Julian Gross, who has negotiated many 
of these CBAs, readily admits that from the community's perspec­
tive, there are significant difficulties with these agreements, particu­
larly that of monitoring them.82 The greater problem, however, is 
the inherent limitations of negotiating project-by-project and the 
76. See id. at 69 (discussing how commitments to provide community benefits 
often go unfulfilled and difficulties in monitoring and enforcement are a widespread 
problem). 
77. Id. 
78. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 12. 
79. GROSS, LERoy & JANIS-ApARICIO, supra note 74, at 22-23. 
80. /d. at 22-23 ("Community groups want to use past commitments as a 'floor,' 
but developers will want to use them as a 'ceiling."'). 
81. See Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 12 (describing urban neighborhoods as the epit­
ome of negative pluralism). 
82. GROSS, LERoy & JANIS-ApARICIO, supra note 74, at 70 ("Community groups 
should consider how each benefit in a CBA will be monitored. Financial commitments 
and other one-time benefits are probably the easiest aspects of a CBA to monitor. 
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burdens such negotiations place on grassroots, poorly funded, vol­
unteer-based community groups. This means that the reality is that 
such resources can only be deployed or marshaled for the large de­
velopment projects that have a broader impact, leaving the no-Iess­
important smaller projects unmonitored by community participa­
tion.83 According to Gross, 
The goal of the community benefits movement is to avoid 
this situation by changing the paradigm of land use planning for 
large, publicly-subsidized projects or those requiring major land 
use approvals. Results of this change will take many concrete 
forms: citywide policies providing minimum standards for certain 
projects; changes in land use planning documents, like general 
plans, to require analysis of economic effects of land use deci­
sions; ordinances requiring close scrutiny of high-impact big-box 
stores; and an expectation that certain large, prominent, heavily 
subsidized projects will have a CBA.84 
Possibly the biggest problem for the CBA approach is that the 
realized benefits of the agreement will depend on how the project 
develops and whether the phases of development come to pass. 
This all depends on the market, unexpected expenses, and a variety 
of factors subject to unanticipated, but to be expected, change. 
Overall, while this type of agreement would benefit from more em­
pirical research, it illustrates an attempt to assert the concerns of 
local residents-that is, the public, in the public-private 
partnership. 
CONCLUSION 
The new response to the public-private partnership is still 
evolving. While participatory mechanisms are probably providing a 
role for the public, they are not the only procedural elements that 
are missing from the development process. Real substantive stan­
dards about the desirable public outcomes for development are just 
as, if not more, important. Substantive legislative input would be 
most helpful, but there is a conflict of interest at the state and city 
level of government that prevents this from happening-cities and 
states have a real motivation (some would say it is imperative) to 
conduct economic development and a high disincentive to put what 
Much more challenging are ongoing tenant commitments, such as living wage and local 
hiring requirements."). 
83. Id. at 75. 
84. Id. 
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appear to be obstacles in the path of this important endeavor. Be­
cause economic development is so broad and can justify anything, 
there is a role for the courts to monitor the development process. 
In order to keep the public in the public-private process, it is up to 
the courts to give true meaning and application to the array of con­
stitutional and statutory checks on the privatization of public power 
and protect the public interest in the pUblic-private partnership. 
The difficulty is that each of these mandates for "publicness" is 
subject to interpretation, and economic development will appear in 
an incalculable number of shapes and sizes. Therefore, just as with 
the evolution of the regulatory takings doctrine, for example, the 
analysis will often be case-by-case and fact specific. With judicial 
intervention likely to increase, wherever the specter of eminent do­
main looms, it will still be important for legislatures to begin consid­
ering substantive mandates that specifically define the public 
interest to be protected. Mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances 
and community benefits agreements are excellent examples of ap­
proaches for getting the "public" back into public-private partner­
ships, each of which provides steps towards establishing clear 
substantive standards of public benefit for these projects. Though it 
is difficult to scrutinize economic development, it is worthwhile. 
